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Most systems engineering courses and text-
books discuss only the engineering aspects of
the subject and are silent about the non-
technical world's influence on the planned
project. This approach, although entirely
satisfactory for many engineering programs,
including smaller NASA programs, leaves
out a significant element affecting large
NASA programs. Some traditionalists be-
lieve these nontechnical aspects should not
even be considered in the systems engineer-
ing process. However, if we take the broad
view that systems engineering should take
into account all significant requirements in
order to produce the proper end-product,
then it should include consideration of those
outside non-technical parties who can levy
requirements on NASA programs. This pa-
per identifies these elements, discusses their
viewpoints and probable influence, and re-
views some past case histories as illustra-
tions of these problems. It also presents some
suggestions for working with these non-
technical groups, which ma3 better achieve
overall optimum systems engineering and
integration (SE&I) solutions.
THE NON-TECHNICAL GROUPS
There are many outside parties that provide
inputs to NASA program requirements.
The public at large can have a profound
influence on whether large sums are appro-
priated for NASA's major programs. They
respond to NASA triumphs and disasters
and are sensitive to NASA's role in projec-
ting the American image around the world.
Their influence is exercised by letters to
Congress and the White House, by public
appearances (interviews and speeches, for
example), and through public opinion polls
/sBs  
p
regarding the space program. All of these
methods influence both the executive and
legislative branches of our government.
The President and his staff are very im-
portant to NASA's programs. They must
make a positive decision to include money for
specific NASA programs in the budget re-
quest before it is even considered by Con-
gress. In these times of large government
deficits, which makes starting new programs
very difficult, NASA is pressured to cut back
requirements and save money. This pressure
even results in the stretch-out and cancella-
tion of some ongoing projects. Sometimes in
negotiations with the Office of Management
and Budget, NASA is asked to choose be-
tween programs.
The Congress is one of the most signifi-
cant groups that has a major impact on
NASA's requirements. In addition to repre-
senting their constituents' opinions, mem-
bers feel it is their duty to closely watch the
details of NASA's large programs. In the last
several decades, they have acquired the tech-
nical staff needed to exercise this detailed
oversight. As a result, they are in a position
to demand program requirement changes,_
and they have the appropriation muscle to
back up their demands.
The Department of Defense (DoD) and
other national security agencies often get
involved in NASA's programs because they
have agreed to participate in a joint develop-
ment or because they plan to use the end-
product. They are involved in monitoring
NASA's projects from a national security
viewpoint, and they sometimes require
changes in NASA programs if they see
potential security problems. DoD is always
included as a major player in any high-level
White House space study or committee.
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Some NASA partisans feel that certain DoD
offices take a biased view and try to reduce
the NASA program so DoD can play a larger
role in space study.
Other executive departments substan-
tially involved in NASA program matters
include the State Department, the Com-
merce Department, the Transportation
Department, and the Office of Management
and Budget.
Government agencies and national com-
missions that fact-find, study and advise the
executive and legislative branches upon re-
quest include the General Accounting Office,
the Office of Technology Assessment, the
National Academy of Sciences, the National
Academy of Engineering, the National
Research Council, the National Commission
on the Challenger Accident, the Advisory
Committee on the Future of the U.S. Space
Program, and a number of other ad hoc com-
mittees.
International cooperation agreements
often involve political considerations, and
the foreign parties usually desire a part of
the job that interfaces with many of the
mainstream elements. If these agreements
are not structured with the interface prob-
lems in mind, they can have major effects on
systems engineering.
Scientific specialist groups feel they could
more wisely spend the money appropriated
for the large NASA manned space programs
on their own research or on unmanned scien-
tific space programs. This group sometimes
works through "associations" seeking to
plead their case in the media.
Local communities near NASA centers
often inject themselves into the process of
dividing the program work between Centers.
The actual division of work can have a sub-
stantial effect on the efficiency of the collec-
tive NASA effort and can make the systems
engineering effort much more difficult than
a distribution based on technical merits. The
political realities usually result in a "techni-
cally non-optimum" work split.
EXAMPLES FROM THE PAST
History provides examples of political and
institutional influences that illustrate how
these factors affect NASA's programs. After
the first Sputnik launch, the basic thrust to
start the space agency, as well as to initiate
the Mercury Program, came mostly from
Congress, with lukewarm support from the
Eisenhower administration. NASA's foun-
ding organizations, the National Advisory
Committee for Aeronautics (NACA), was
used as a technical staff; decisive actions
were primarily political in nature.
During the sixties, the Kennedy Admin-
istration's decision to land astronauts on the
Moon and return them safely was political;
namely, to catch up with the Russians and
get back U.S. world technological leadership.
NASA provided a large part of the technical
staff work, which consisted of preliminary
analyses and estimated success probabil-
ities.
In the case of the Space Shuttle start deci-
sion, interaction increased between systems
engineering and the non-technical world.
Richard Nixon had become President in ear-
ly 1969, just a few months before the lunar
landing. He requested the National Space
Council to study and report on the options for
the next phase of space flight and the long-
term future. NASA was heavily involved in
this year-long study. The report recommend-
ed that development of a Space Station and a
fully reusable Space Shuttle be undertaken
in parallel as the next step in manned space
flight and as the precursor of later lunar
colonies and manned Mars expeditions. At
this point, a political decision was made to
continue study of the Space Shuttle but to
defer the Space Station. Work then proceed-
ed on the Shuttle with Phase A contracts and
then Phase B contracts. It soon became
apparent that the Shuttle development cost
was more than double the original prelimi-
nary estimates used in earlier decision
making. Much interaction ensued between
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NASA, the Office of Management and Bud-
get, and Congress, with NASA trying to get
the added funding commitment. When this
was not forthcoming, the program manage-
ment exhorted the projects to reduce cost
without changing the basic concept.
After more work confirmed that the cost
ceiling could not be achieved with the two-
stage fully reusable Shuttle, it was finally
decided by NASA management that the
concept had to be changed in order to stay
within funding limitations imposed by the
Administration. Phase B contracts were
extended, a major realignment of contractor
teams was required, and the current Space
Shuttle configuration (solid first stage,
parallel burn) emerged. After the Apollo
program and its blank check atmosphere,
NASA was not used to this limited funding
approach.
This process left much to be desired from
many points of view. It delayed the program,
caused a lot of wasted effort, and contractors
formed teams and wasted a lot of their dis-
cretionary funds (estimated at $100 million).
No one is to blame for this, since everyone
was feeling their way in a new environment.
A better process, however, would have been
very worthwhile.
In contrast to the Shuttle, the Space Sta-
tion did have strong support from President
Reagan. This support was not for short-term
political gain but rather because President
Reagan believed it was in the best long-term
interest of the country, despite the fact that
most of the President's cabinet members and
his close advisors were against starting the
space station (Hans Mark's book).
The fragmented nature of the final Space
Station hardware split between Centers
resulted from an intense tug of war for
appropriate shares of the program between
the NASA Centers and their supporting
political communities. Some NASA Centers
felt that much of this struggle was for their
very survival. Others in NASA felt this type
of work distribution was necessary for broad
Congressional support. While the final sys-
tem is probably workable, it certainly is not
considered optimum from a technical or effi-
ciency viewpoint.
MINIMIZING DISRUPTION FROM
POLITICAL AND INSTITUTIONAL SOURCES
We have identified many of the outside
sources of SE&I requirements and have
given some examples to illustrate how im-
portant these inputs can be. Although most
of these examples involve major program
changes, many smaller requirements are
questioned and changed. Now we will discuss
methods of dealing with these inputs effi-
ciently, minimizing disruption and avoiding
adversarial relationships with these outside
organizations.
Good two-way communication between
NASA and these outside groups is one of the
major keys to negotiating proper agreements
on these external requirements. In order to
properly deal with these outside inputs, we
need to know what new requirements they
are considering before these requirements
are placed on NASA as irreversible de-
mands. If we wait until then, it is very
probable that we will develop adversarial re-
lationships with the requester who has "gone
public" and will be embarrassed to lose the
argument. This will make the requestor very
difficult to deal with during subsequent
negotiations.
This means NASA must be organized and
managed in a manner that facilitates com-
munication of both internal and external
pertinent information.
Most of these outside inputs are discussed
at lower levels during interface or coordina-
tion meetings as "what ifs." They rarely first
surface at the NASA decision level in the
program office or the SE&I management.
This means that the lower-level NASA peo-
ple interfacing with outside organizations
must be trained to recognize these potential
inputs at the beginning, and the overall
NASA organization must have good commu-
nications at all levels so these issues can get
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to the appropriate level early, a strategy can
be developed, special analyses can be per-
formed, and contacts to discuss the issues
can be planned.
When preparing the material for discus-
sion with the requester, NASA must be very
careful to consider the requestor's point of
view objectively and not just from the NASA
parochial viewpoint of pure engineering
ease, i.e., the "invented here" syndrome or
the "bad for the Center" rationale. NASA
must remember it is not the user or the own-
er but rather the implementor of someone
else's requirements. When presenting the
material, NASA must be careful to avoid
patronizing the requester. If the requestor
senses a patronizing attitude, the relation-
ship rapidly becomes adversarial.
It is also important for NASA to advise
and sell the appropriate outside groups on
any requirement changes they feel are neces-
sary before the action has been taken beyond
the point of reasonable return. This is par-
ticularly true when NASA wants to relax
requirements that were important to outside
groups once the program was begun. Many
examples exist where Congress finds out
after the fact that the program can no longer
meet the planned launch rate or some other
fundamental requirement, and the original
"NASA promise" must be broken. This has a
very negative effect on rapport with Con-
gress, the scientific community or any other
major stakeholder. It is therefore important
to level with these outside groups as quickly
as possible after deciding to revise a basic
requirement.
NASA must also develop harmonious re-
lationships with the pertinent outside groups
and individuals. This can be done, among
other ways, using a network of committees or
scheduled small meetings among selected
individuals. The important thing is to plan
for relationships and have the meetings reg-
ularly. These meetings should be used to
bring the groups up to date, to permit them
to ask questions and critique the activity, to
smoke out impending requirements, changes
or additions, and to develop rapport. While
doing these things, it is very important for
NASA individuals to come across as open,
forthright, and on top of their jobs. If the out-
side participants sense ulterior motives that
are not discussed, or evasiveness and bluff-
ing, trust cannot develop. In fact, many of
these groups currently have a "corporate
memory," which includes perceptions of
many NASA Center biases. These must be
overcome by careful and fair negotiations,
bending over backward to diffuse any biased
reputation.
NASA Centers have tended to think of
many of these non-technical meetings as
NASA Headquarters' responsibility (and a
big, time-wasting nuisance), believing the
Center's only role should be the engineering
and management of the program. For NASA
to do the most efficient and effective job, this
concept must be changed. Whereas NASA
Headquarters should participate in many of
these contacts, the Center people who best
know the subject and have prepared the
material should present it. This is also an
excellent training mechanism. The younger
Center people will rapidly develop a much
broader view of the outside world from inter-
acting with NASA. Working with the
centers in this manner, Headquarters also
facilitates better internal communications.
Interfacing with Congress presents some
special problems, particularly when NASA
is trying to sell them a new program. There
are laws prohibiting government employees
from lobbying, and the line between lobbying
and briefing on the merits of a new program
is somewhat blurred. NASA must use its leg-
islative and legal offices to help the program
people properly interpret the law. In all
probability, NASA will not be able to com-
municate with Congress on critical subjects
in the manner and with the frequency they
desire.
An alternative to direct NASA communi-
cation with Congress is for NASA to work
with its contractors and keep them informed.
The contractors are not bound by any laws
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against lobbying and can communicate more
freely with Congress. The contractors will
contact the appropriate Representatives and
their staffs with their own messages, in any
case. It is not necessary for NASA to direct
them to lobby (this being illegal), but NASA
should inform them of its position so that if
the contractors do contact Congress, they
have the correct information.
On some past programs, all of the prime
contractors informally worked together to
keep Congress informed. One technique that
has been popular with Congress is an "Infor-
mation Notebook" on a given NASA pro-
gram. This notebook is kept in the Congres-
sional member's office for easy reference and
is updated monthly, providing a useful
monthly resource for informal discussions.
NATIONAL STRATEGIC PLANNING FOR
SPACE
After the Apollo program and President
Kennedy's clear mandate to land astronauts
on the Moon and return in the sixties, the
U.S. space program suffered from a lack of
clear national goals and a strategic plan to
achieve them. In the Apollo era, all of the
diverse forces involved coalesced behind
President Kennedy because they wanted to
beat our superpower adversary, the U.S.S.R.,
in the technological war. Since that time, we
have been unable to generate such a unify-
ing environment. If this could be done, and a
framework for future space activity could be
agreed on in the form of a strategic plan, the
problems of interfacing with the outside
groups would be much easier.
As of this writing, the Bush administra-
tion has outlined a long-range plan for explo-
ration that includes colonizing the Moon a
and a manned exploration of Mars, which
could form the framework for a good strate-
gic plan. However, it must be accepted by
these outside parties and backed with appro-
priations by Congress before any plan can
realistically be made. During this period of a
growing national deficit, tensions in the
Middle East, and the bail-out of the savings
and loan industry, such an ambitious plan
will be difficult to accomplish.
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
External groups have a significant impact on
NASA's programs. Ten groups affecting
NASA are identified, and examples are
given for some of the them. Methods of deal-
ing with these external inputs are discussed,
the most important being good and open two-
way communications and an objective atti-
tude on the part of the NASA participants.
The importance of planning ahead, of devel-
oping rapport with these groups, and of effec-
tive use of NASA contractors is covered. The
need for an overall strategic plan for the U.S.
space program is stressed.
In order to obtain the broadest range of
opinions on the political and institutional
factors that affect systems engineering, the
writer requested thoughts from a number of
senior individuals who have been involved in
the interfaces between NASA and the out-
side world.
In any subject as complex as this one,
there are always some differences of opinion.
The viewpoints expressed above are those of
the writer and sometimes agree with the
majority, and at other times do not. To pro-
vide the reader with another viewpoint, an
additional paper by David Wensley is repro-
duced in its entirety in the appendix to this
chapter. Mr. Wensley examines the subject
through the eyes of a prime Space Station
contractor executive.
The author concludes that NASA does not
pay sufficient attention to the impact of
political and institutional factors in con-
ducting its business and is being hurt by this
attitude. NASA should therefore focus on
working with these outside groups, adjust
NASA policies and organizations to
facilitate interfacing with them, and train
NASA personnel to conduct themselves ap-
propriately in this environment.
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POLITICAL AND INSTITUTIONAL FACTORS AFFECTING
SYSTEMS ENGINEERING: AN INDUSTRY PERSPECTIVE
by David Wensley
The "nominal" or "idealized" systems engi-
neering process must take into consideration
the political and institutional factors that
have become prevalent in the government
funded and, to a certain extent, the privately
funded civil space activity. Attempts to ig-
nore these influences may result in delay and
frustration of the systems engineering pro-
cess.
NASA programs are currently growing
larger in scope, longer in duration and fewer
in number. The increasing number of partici-
pants includes NASA Centers, other U.S.
agencies, international agencies and contrac-
tors. NASA programs are also characterized
by higher public visibility, and are more cost-
ly and more politically sensitive.
In this environment, the Congressional
committees that appropriate and authorize
budgets will demand more justification for
expenditures, more political return from the
investments and more oversight of ongoing
activities.
POLITICAL FACTORS
Space projects have always been an instru-
ment of domestic politics and a tool of politi-
cal influence in international relations. As
the scope and importance of these projects
increases, we can expect more political influ-
ence on the systems engineering process.
The political influence may take any of
several forms:
• Geographical distribution of funds to gain
political support.
• Creation of international partnerships.
• Insertion of technical requirements to
satisfy strategic national goals.
• Increased Congressional and Administra-
tion involvement in the technical
decision- making processes.
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• Funding constraints used as a mechanism
of technical and political control.
An effective project management and
systems engineering process must deal con-
structively with these influences. They may
affect program content, allocation of respon-
sibilities, schedules, interface definitions,
optimization and trade-off criteria, and tech-
nical decisions. They may even affect mission
definition, and they most certainly will affect
funding availability versus time. Effective
management must provide for flexibility to
react to these influences without undue pen-
alties on performance, cost or schedule. A
constructive and cooperative relationship
between the legislators and program man-
agement can minimize the impact of these
interactions on planned efforts.
Many examples of the influences noted
above can be cited in the Space Station Free-
dom program, including:
• Legislated use of a Flight Telerobotic
Servicer to advance U.S. robotic technol-
ogy.
• Allocation of responsibilities to interna-
tional partners.
• Political influence on the work distribu-
tion between NASA Centers.
• Increased complexity of interfaces and
management processes resulting from
distributed responsibilities.
• Funding constraints (fencing) in budget
authorization bills.
• Oversight committees and hearings to
critique technical progress and to influ-
ence resolution of technical issues.
The systems engineering process must
stand the tests of external review and cri-
tique. The assumption that technical man-
agement and decision making is part of an
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immune internal process is, unfortunately,
unrealistic. Techniques for effectively
managing the external factors include:
• Open communication between project
management and stakeholders to under-
stand needs and develop trust.
• Realistic planning to support schedule
and cost commitments.
• Disciplined control of requirements to
avoid unwarranted cost and schedule
growth.
• Effective use of risk management tech-
niques to minimize iterations on design
and testing.
• Cost-effectiveness and life-cycle cost ana-
lysis to substantiate trade decisions.
• Early emphasis on operations, mainten-
ance and logistical support to avoid un-
predicted support costs.
• Early constructive resolution of responsi-
bility conflicts between NASA Centers
and between NASA and international
partners.
These features are characteristic of tradi-
tional management and represent the expec-
tations of legislators and budget authorities.
Deviations from these norms, especially if
uncovered through Congressional or media
probing, can be disruptive and potentially
dangerous to the stability and continuity of a
program. The systems engineering process
can significantly reduce these risks by stay-
ing on track and by making summary data
available to project managers to use in open
dialogue with legislators.
Program changes are unavoidable, and
systems engineering and project manage-
ment must be equipped with the analytical
tools to respond effectively to these changes.
The ability to re-prioritize and reschedule ac-
tivities rapidly and with reasonable accuracy
is essential, especially in response to funding
adjustments emanating from the annual
budgetary process. More often than not,
these events are unanticipated and result in
traumatic and costly adjustments. A pre-
planned strategy for deferral of less critical
elements, retaining the systems engineering
effort to establish interface requirements
and essential design definitions, can mini-
mize such effects.
INSTITUTIONAL FACTORS
Numerous institutional factors will affect
the systems engineering process, principally
those inherent in NASA and the participat-
ing Centers. Examples include:
• Accepted standards, design criteria, and
specifications.
• Design, management and operational
preferences of the Center functional divi-
sions.
• Availability and preference for use of
Center test facilities.
• The organization and management struc-
ture adopted for the program.
• Traditional practices such as use of com-
mittees, panels, boards, documentation
formats and integration processes.
• Use of support contractors to supplement
NASA staff.
• NASA and Center policies and priorities
that may influence, for example, technol-
ogy selections, responsibility issues and
requirements decisions.
The above considerations can have a
major impact on systems engineering
requirements derivations, trade studies, ar-
chitecture and design selections, test plans
and operational concepts. They will also af-
fect the schedule and effort required to
evolve the design baseline, to resolve inte-
gration issues and to establish interface
agreements. The potential magnitude of
these effects dictates early planning for their
accommodation in the systems engineering
process. It is virtually pointless to embark on
a systems engineering process that ignores
these considerations. The institutional char-
acteristics have evolved over time and are
the product of many successes and failures. It
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is unlikely that personnel assigned to new
projects will adopt practices that violate
tradition. Contractor personnel should be
prepared to adapt to customer preferences,
but customer (NASA) personnel should be
prepared to consider new alternatives as part
of a continuous improvement process.
THE SEARCH FOR IMPROVEMENT
and contractors must be measured as ele-
ments of a closed-loop process that affects the
efficiency and quality of our space activities.
The identification of improvement candi-
dates should focus on the inanimate process,
not on the organizations or people. This
allows the people to conduct constructive
problem identification and resolution with-
out personal implications.
Increased budget pressures and heightened
concern for foreign competition create a
demand for NASA to seek new methods of
achieving quality and reducing costs. Indus-
try is similarly under pressure in these areas
and is rapidly adopting techniques such as
Total Quality Management (TQM) princi-
ples. NASA is beginning to apply TQM crite-
ria in new procurements and has started to
look for TQM opportunities within its organi-
zational structure. Conversion to these prin-
ciples represents a major cultural change
and, in many respects, is contrary to recent
trends within NASA. TQM teachings empha-
size reduction in top-down management di-
rection, preferring increased delegation and
empowerment of the lower tier personnel.
Since the Challenger accident, the tendency
within NASA has been to increase manage-
ment and technical oversight. In the Space
Station Freedom program, for example,
many layers of management and technical
oversight exist within the Level II and Level
III organizations above the prime contractors
and their subcontractor teams. Although
contractors are generally committed to cost
and schedule objectives, their progress is of-
ten controlled by the efficiency and speed of
the NASA management and systems engi-
neering processes and integration. If the in-
volved participants agree that improvement
is essential to create an environment of
credibility and trust at the political level,
recognition of these relationships can lead to
constructive changes.
Measurement of performance is essential
in the search for improvement. Both NASA
CONCLUSION
NASA stands at a crossroads. The opportuni-
ties for space exploration and the exploita-
tion of space attributes and resources have
never been better. Public acceptance of space
projects and reliance on space technology as
a means to resolve worldwide environmental
and resource issues have never been higher.
Yet NASA lacks credibility with the legisla-
tors of this country who are eager to voice
criticism of NASA's planning and implemen-
tation of space projects. Their depth of pene-
tration into NASA's technical activities is
increasing. Not only is the continuity of
NASA funding at risk, the scope of NASA's
responsibilities is also threatened. Transfer
of responsibilities to other agencies and even
the creation of new agencies is topical con-
versation. Resolution of this dilemma
requires more than a willingness to commu-
nicate and to negotiate differences; it re-
quires a change in the NASA management
culture that recognizes the degree of matur-
ity of the space industry. The mystery of
discovery and the complexity of space tech-
nology is no longer an adequate defense for
cost or schedule overruns. Critics demand
performance that meets expectations. NASA
has the opportunity to lead the family of
federal agencies in demonstrating fiscal
responsibility combined with technical
achievements. Systems engineering will be a
major contributor to this success by provid-
ing the guidance for timely decisions leading
to effective project management.
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